


De impact van NTP security tekortkomingen op DNS(SEC)



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SIDNfonds Startbijeenkomst call | 2017

Domain Name System



DNSSEC



DNSSEC



Total number of secure delegations: 7375455

Zone	DNSSEC	NSEC(3)	Signed
nl.	true	NSEC3	2618262
com.br	true	NSEC3	771183
cz.	true	NSEC3	638970
se	true	NSEC	607290
com.	true	NSEC3	588136
no.	true	NSEC3	431968
eu.	true	NSEC3	365356
fr.	true	NSEC3	337751
be.	true	NSEC3	132395
net.	true	NSEC3	113548
hu.	true	NSEC3	111436

DNSSEC




DNSSEC



Network Time Protocol

D.L. Mills
M/A-COM Linkabit
September 1985



protocol (NTP)



Proposed protocol for the ARPA-Internet
discussion and suggestions for improvements.
limited.

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Service Model
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ation

5.4. Rev
6. Appendix A. UDP
Appendix B. NTP Data

Network Time Protocol (NTP), a protocol
clocks using a set of distribut
User Datagram Protocol
transport mechanism.
the ICMP Time Stamp mes

Network Time Protocol



Attacking NTP's Authenticated Broadcast

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used protocol for the ARPA-I
ession and suggestions f
ited.

ACT

two attacks on the Network Time Protocol (NTP)'s
ically-authenticated broadcast mode. First, we
lay attack that allows an on-path attacker to se-
a broadcast client to a specific time. Sec-
at a denial-of-service (DoS) attack that al-
attacker to prevent a broadcast client from
s system clock; to do this, the attacker
single malformed broadcast packet per
r DoS attack also applies to all other
e 'ephemeral' or 'preemptable' (includ-
etc). We then use network measure-
e that NTP's broadcast and other
modes are being used in the
ing why NTP's current
cryptographic
broadcast

mended by the NTP specification [1] and requ-
open-source NTP reference implementation *ntpd*,
provide sufficient protection against attacks on
mode. We consider both (1) on-path attacks, on
tacker occupies a privileged position on the path
NTP client and one of its servers, and (2) off-pat-
where the attacker can be anywhere on the path
not observe the traffic between client and server.
We present an on-path
broadcast mode (CVE
to get stuck at
denial-of-



De impact van NTP security tekortkomingen op DNS(SEC)

- WAT ZIJN DE KWETSBAARHEID VAN DNS / DNSSEC IMPLEMENTATIES VOOR TIMINGAANVALLEN?
- WAT ZIJN DE AFHANKELIJKHEID VAN HET NEDERLANDSE DNS-ECOSYSTEEM VAN DOOR NTP VERKREGEN TIJD?
- WAT ZIJN DE DAARDOOR INHERENTE KWETSBAARHEID VOOR NTP-ATTACKS?