
Measuring DNS and DoH

AT THE



HACKATHON TRACK

INTERNET

KAMPALA – UGANDA

19 & 20 JUNE 2019

SUMMIT'19

CHAMPIONS:

Willem Toorop NLNET**LABS**

Jasper den Hertog RIPE NCC

Who are we?

- Willem Toorop
- Developer @ ONLINETLABS
- Loves doing Hackathons
- Internet measurements with RIPE Atlas

Who are we?

- Jasper den Hertog
- Developer @ RIPE NCC
- Loves doing Hackathons
- Internet measurements with RIPE Atlas


What is/What does NLNETLABS

- Objective:
 - To develop Open Source Software and
 Open Standards for the benefit of the Internet,



What is/What does RIPE NCC

• Regional Internet Registry for Europe, the Middle East and parts of Central Asia



Measuring DNS and DoH Topics & motivation

Current trend is DNS resolvers moving to cloud



Not just with the network or user's consent

Current trend is DNS res



- Not just with the network
- HOW? WHY?

doh - willem@nlnetlabs.r 🖵 Get Messages 🔽 🖍 Write 🖵 Chat 🙎 Address Book **Q**uick Filter 🛇 Tag 🗸 Ξ Q Filter these messages <Ctrl+Shift+K> From Subject Date へ民 00 [Doh] Clarification for a newbie D... 18-04-19 09:12 Mark Delany Fric Rescorla [Doh] Mozilla's plans re: DoH 27-03-19 10:16 Matthew Pounsett Re: [Doh] Mozilla's plans re: ... 27-03-19 11:18 🖪 Reply List **5** Reply 🕅 Delete ~ → Forward Archive 💧 🔊 Junk More 🗸 From Fric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Subject Re: [Doh] Mozilla's plans re: DoH 27-03-19 10:24 To DoH WG <doh@ietf.org> This message may be a scam. Preferences

With that problem statement, here are our plans:

We have implemented DNS over HTTPS [RFC8484] and would like to deploy it by default for our users. We intend to select a set of Trusted Recursive Resolvers (TRRs) that we will use for DoH resolution. TRRs will be required to conform to a specific set of policies intended to protect user privacy. We're still refining the final policy but we expect it to roughly match the one that Cloudflare has already agreed to use

(https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/commitment-to-privacy/).While we expect the initial set of TRRs to be small, we're interested in adding new providers who are able to comply with these policies. The precise details of the user interface are TBD, but we expect something like the following:

1. Copies of Firefox will be configured with a set of TRRs. Different regions may have different TRR sets or different defaults. In addition we may have DoH/TRR on by default in some regions and not others, especially initially.

Privacy

March 2011: I-D Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols

June 2013: Snowden Revelations Morecowbell

July 2013 : RFC6973 Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols

May 2014: RFC7258 Pervasive Monitoring is an Attack




July 2013 : RFC6973 Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols

May 2014: RFC7258 Pervasive Monitoring is an Attack

Picture © (CC BY 3.0) Laura Poitras

Privacy Folk Singer

Privacy



NSA's Morecowbell on DNS based pervasive monitoring system

Encryption Everywhere **NS** cols May 20_. **Pervasive Monitoring** is an Attack May 2016: RFC7858 **DNS-over-TLS (DoT)** October 2018: RFC8484 **DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH)**

Picture © (CC BY 3.0) Laura Poitras

Privacy Folk Singer

DNS Measurements Hackathon Track Topics and motivation

- How would centralized cloud provided DNS resolvers impact Internet in the African region?
- Does it have performance implications?
- Does it have other implications? (Political?)
- Is it beneficial and achievable to provide local DoT or DoH resolvers?
- How can this best be achieved/realized?

Measuring DNS and DoH Topics and motivation

- Optimal DNS Latency
 - Compare latency of probes resolvers to cloud resolvers
- Resolver Jedi
 - How local are probe resolvers?
 Do they cross country borders?
- Run your own DoH and/or DoT server
 - Howto and evaluation of different possibilities
- DoH with DNS Messages in JSON
 - Provide DoH which is actually usable for applications

Measuring DNS and DoH Preperation


- A not so short introduction to DNS
 - why is it the way it is
 - where did it came from and
 - how did it evolve in response to what

Name Space on the Internet




- Finding IP addresses
 - Start with a domain name (human form)
 - Translating to an IP address (machine form)
- What is the IP address of internetsummit.africa?
 - Client asks server
 - Server responds with answer
 - ... case closed?

Name Space on the Internet








• December 1973 HOSTS.TXT (RFC 606)

Namespace on the Internet



Name Spaces on the Internet




Paul Mockapetris - © CC BY-SA 4.0 by Oscured

- 1 January 1983 NCP \rightarrow IP/TCP flagday
- max $256 \rightarrow max 4.294.967.296$ hosts
- November 1983 DNS (RFC 882)


Domain Name System

 November 1987 STD13 (RFC 1034 & RFC 1035)

First implementation: https://www.hactrn.net/hacks/jeeves/



Domain Name Space - scale




Domain Name Space - scale

Α	VeriSign	198.41.0.4 2001:503:BA3E::2:30	н	US Army	128.63.2.53 2001:500:1::803f:235
В	USC-ISI	192.228.79.201 2001:478:65::53	I	Netnod	192.36.148.17 2001:7fe::53
С	Cogent	192.33.4.12 2001:500:2::c	J	VeriSign	192.58.128.30 2001:503:C27::2:30
D	Uni Maryland	199.7.91.13 2001:500:2d::d	К	RIPE NCC	193.0.14.129 2001:7fd::1
Е	NASA	192.203.230.10 2001:500:a8::e	L	ICANN	199.7.83.42 2001:500:3::42
F	ISC	192.5.5.241 2001:500:2f::f	Μ	WIDE Project	202.12.27.33 2001:dc3::35
G	DoD	192.112.36.4 2001:500:12::d0d			

Domain Name Space - scale



Domain Name System - scale




Domain Name System - scale


Authoritatives


www.afrinic.net A


- **UDP** = No State on authoritatives
- **Caching** Recursive Resolvers:
 - Reduce load to authoritatives
 - Reduce latency to stub



 Random bits (65.536 query ID * source ports) & Caching as security mechanism







Method	5% chance	50% chance	# Bits
Query ID	1 second	10 seconds	16
1024 source ports	17 minute	2.8 hours	26
All source ports + 2 bits server selection	2.8 days	28 days	34
0x20 hack	2844.4 days	288444 days	44

Help with spoofing DNS responses

Fragmentation Considered Poisonous

Amir Herzberg[†] and Haya Shulman[‡] Dept. of Computer Science, Bar Ilan University [†]amir.herzberg@gmail.com, [‡]haya.shulman@gmail.com

Abstract

ent practical *poisoning* and *name-server block*s on standard DNS resolvers, by *off-path*, *av rsaries*. Our attacks exploit large DNS hat cause IP fragmentation; such long reinveasingly common, mainly due to the use

1) cenarios, where DNSSEC is partially or

sary that is able to send spoofed packets (but not to intercept, modify or block packets). The most well known is Kaminsky's DNS poisoning attack [21], which was exceedingly effective against many resolvers at the time (2008). Kaminsky's attack, and most other known DNS poisoning attacks, allows the attacker to cause resolvers to provide incorrect (poisoned) responses to DNS queries of the clients, and thereby 'hijack' a domain name. We

Help with spoofing DNS responses

attacker ICMP frag needed \rightarrow authoritative

Offsets	Octet				()								1									2								3	3				
Octet	Bit	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	L 1	12 :	13	14	15	16	17	18	1	9 2	2	1	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	3 29	9	30 3	81
0	0		v	4		I	HL	= 20)				Т	0	s									٦	Tot	al I	.er	gth	=	56						
4	32								IP	ID									x	DI	M	-					F	rag	01	fse	t					
8	64				Т	TL						Pro	oto	oce	ol =	1								IP	He	ad	er	Che	ck	sun	n					
12	96														S	iou	rce	e IP	• = 6	5.6	.6.6	;														
16	128													I	Des	stir	nati	ion	IP	= 2	2.2.	2.2	2													
20	160			Т	ype	e =	3					C	od	le	= 4	ŀ										ИP	Ch	eck	su	m						
24	192							ι	Jnu	sed																MI	U	= 10	00							
28	224		v	4		I	HL	= 20)				Т	0	s									٦	lot	al I	.er	gth	=	76						
32	256								IP	ID									х	DI	M	-					F	rag	01	fse	t					
36	288				Т	TL					۱	Pro	to	со) =	17								IP	He	ad	er	Che	ck	sun	n					
40	320														S	iou	rce	e IP) = 2	2.2	.2.2	2														
44	352													I	Des	stir	nati	ion	IP	= 7	7.7.	7.7	,													
48	384						Sc	ourc	e F	ort	= !	53											D	est	ina	tic	on I	Port	t =	123	845	;				
52	416								not	h = !	56																100	ksu	m	- 0						

in reasingly common, mainly due to the use

prac

1) cenarios, where DNSSEC is partially or

to provide incorrect (poisoned) responses to DNS queries of the clients, and thereby 'hijack' a domain name. We



Help with spoofing DNS responses

I^{e} fragment authoritative \rightarrow resolver

41-	1000	A CONTRACT OF A CONTRACT			A.															
Offsets	Octet	0	1					2							3			Offsets	Octet	
Octet	Bit	0 1 2 3 4 5 6	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	16	5 17	7 1	8 19	2	0 21	22	23	24	1 25	26 2	7 28 29 30 31			Octet	Bit	(
0	0	v4 IHL = 20	TOS						To	tal	Len	ngtl	h =	85		Î	nta	0	0	
4	32	IPID	= 23456	x	DF	FN	IF				Fra	ag (Offs	et = (D	포코		4	32	
8	64	TTL	Protocol = 17						IP H	ead	ler	Ch	eck	sum		IP Header		8	64	
12	96		Source IF	• = :	2.2	.2	2									4	H	12	96	
16	128		Destination	I IP	= 7	7.7	.7.7									Ļ		16	128	
20	160	Source	e Port = 53					D	estin	atio	on I	Por	rt =	1234	5	UDP Header	on	20	160	
24	192	Len	gth = 65					U	DP C	hec	ksu	um	n = 0	x14d	e	v der °	@	24	192	
28	224	TXIC	= 76543	QR	0)pc	ode	= 0	AA (тс	RD	RA	١	z	RCODE = 0	1		28	224	
32	256	Questio	on Count = 1					A	nswe	r Re	eco	ord	Co	unt =	1	DNS Header		32	256	
36	288	Authority R	ecord Count = 0				A	d	ditior	nal	Rec	cor	rd C	ount	= 1	↓₽		36	288	
40	320	4	m					а							i	1				
44	352	I	4					v							i	Sect				
48	384	с	t					2							i	Question Section	sei	rver k	lock	-
52	416	m	0							T	ype	= =	А				b	y off-	path	,
56	448	Cla	ass = IN						N	am	e (F	Poi	inte	r)		₽w₽		large		
60	480	Ту	pe = A							Cl	ass	5 = 1	IN			Answer Section	uc	h lon	g re-	-
64	512		Т	TL												1, a d	lue	e to th	e use	e

^{2e} fragment attacker → resolver

	Offsets	Octet	(C			1					2						3				
	Octet	Bit	0 1 2 3	4 5 6 7	89	10 1	1 12 1	3 14	15 16	5 17	7 18	19 2	20 2	1 22	23	24 2	5 26	27 2	28 2	29 30	31	
nta	0	0	v4	IHL = 20		٦	ros						Т	otal I	eng	gth =	= 85					1
	4	32		IPID =	23456	5			х	DI	F MF			F	rag	Off	set =	48				포코
	8	64	Т	TL		Proto	col = :	17					IP	Head	er C	hec	ksur	n				IP Header
H	12	96					S	ource	IP =	2.2	2.2.2											, F
	16	128					Des	tinati	on IP) = 7	7.7.7	7.7										V UD
0M	20	160		Data Le	ngth =	4								IPv4	Ad	dre	ss					Answ Section
@	24	192		= 2.2	2.2.2						N	ame	= 0					Туре	e			¶, ⊒ d
	28	224	= 0	OPT			UDP	Paylo	ad S	ize	= 40	96				EXT	END	ED-R	RCO	DE =	0	Sec
	32	256	Versie	on = 0	DO				Z								Da	ta Le	ngt	th		Additional Section
	36	288	=	0																		↓ nal


sary that is able to send spoofed packets (but not to intercept, modify or block packets). The most well known is Kaminsky's DNS poisoning attack [21], which was exceedingly effective against many resolvers at the time (2008). Kaminsky's attack, and most other known DNS poisoning attacks, allows the attacker to cause resolvers to provide incorrect (poisoned) responses to DNS queries of the clients, and thereby 'hijack' a domain name. We

1) cenarios, where DNSSEC is partially or

bits	50% chance	5% chance	Method
16	10 seconds	1 seconde	Query ID
26	2,8 uur	17 minutes	1024 source ports
2	0 seconds	0 seconds	All source ports 2 bits server selection
44	288444 days	2844.4 days	0x20 hack


Method	5% chance	50% chance	bits
Query ID	1 seconde	10 seconds	16
1024 source ports	17 minutes	2,8 uur	26
All source ports 2 bits server selection	0 seconds	0 seconds	2
0x20 hack	2844.4 days	288444 days	44
IP ID	0 seconds	0 seconds	5
IPv6 /64 source address	292,837,054 year	2,928,370,544 year	69

• It's not just spoofing




DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)


end-to-end security on top of DNS




DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) Chain of Trust




DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) Validation





DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) end-to-end validation





DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) does not protect against MITM – TLS does!





DNSSEC for Applications voor TLS

- Transport Layer Security (TLS) uses both asymmetric and symmetric encryption
- A symmetric key is sent encrypted with remote public key


• How is the remote public key authenticated?




Cartoon by Kloot

TLS without DNSSEC

- By the Certificate Authorities in OS and/or browser
- Each CA is authorized to authenticate for **any** name (weakest link problem)
- There are more than 1500 CAs (in 2010, see https://www.eff.org/observatory)




DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) end-to-end validation in practice




DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) end-to-end validation in practice

- Reduce load to authoritatives?
- Reduce latency to stub?



DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) consequence of UDP, worse with DNSSEC



Privacy

March 2011: I-D Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols


June 2013: Snowden Revelations Morecowbell

July 2013 : RFC6973 Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols


May 2014: RFC7258 Pervasive Monitoring is an Attack



Privacy



NSA's Morecowbell on DNS based pervasive monitoring system



Privacy issues with DNS minimize # queries – local root

 RFC 7706 -Running a Root Server Local to a Resolver

auth-zone:
name: "."
master: 199.9.14.201
master: 192.33.4.12
master: 199.7.91.13
master: 192.5.5.241
master: 192.112.36.4
master: 193.0.14.129
master: 192.0.47.132
master: 192.0.32.132
fallback-enabled: yes
for-downstream: no
for-upstream: yes
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
"uphound conf"

"unbound.conf



Privacy issues with DNS minimize # queries – aggressive NSEC

• RFC8198 -Aggressive NSEC

\$ dig @k.root-servers.net snow. +norec +dnssec ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, rcode: NXDOMAIN, id: flags: gr aa ; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 6 **QUESTION SECTION:** ;; snow. IN A ;; AUTHORITY SECTION: sncf. 86400 IN NSEC so. NS DS RRSIG NSEC sncf. 86400 IN RRSIG NSEC 8 1 86400 ... 86400 IN NSEC aaa. NS SOA RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY 86400 IN RRSIG NSEC 8 0 86400 ... ;; Query time: 2 msec

Privacy issues with DNS minimize # queries – aggressive NSEC

	Aetric M3 - C	hromium						
🗅 ITHI Metri	ic M3	× +						
← → C	https://ith	ni.privateoctopu	s.com/graph-m3.	.html			☆ ● (w :
Apps ICs	N 👩 🗅	S 📰 😒	🕑 💭 gdns	💱 🌔 stby	🎋 🤮 🔺 🔯	M 🕑 💿	TH	>>
months and the	"historical" mi	inimum and ma	vimum observed	since the beginn	ing of the measure	ments		

months, and the "historical" minimum and maximum observed since the beginning of the measurements.

	Metric		As of Apr 2019	Past 3 months	Historic Low	Historic High
		M3.1 (% No Such Domain queries) (?)	70.31%	68.68%	62.95%	70.75%
		M3.2 (% cacheable queries) (?)	25.89%	27.66%	25.44%	30.97%
		Core (100% - M3.1 - M3.2) (?)	3.80%	3.66%	3.47%	6.77%


Privacy issues with DNS minimize # queries – serve stale

- draft-ietf-dnsop-serve-stale
- Privacy aspect and/or Performance aspect

server:
 serve-expired: yes
 serve-expired-ttl: 300
 serve-expired-ttl-reset: yes

"unbound.conf"





Privacy issues with DNS minimize data in queries – ECS

Remaining (4.6%)


AS397212 (0.1%)


AS7922 (0.1%)

AS13335 (0.7%)

AS30060 (0.0%)

 RFC7871 -EDNS Client Subnet (anti privacy!)





Privacy issues with DNS minimize data in queries – ECS priv.

- RFC7871 -EDNS Client Subnet section 7.1.2:
 - " A SOURCE PREFIX-LENGTH value of 0 means that the Recursive Resolver MUST NOT add the client's address information to its queries."
- unbound respects this
 - Google respects this


EDNS0 option for ECS client privacy
as described in Section 7.1.2 of
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7871

edns_client_subnet_private : 1

"stubby.yml"

OpenDNS does not respect it

Privacy issues with DNS minimize data in queries – qname min




Privacy issues with DNS minimize data in queries – qname min

• With RFC7816 -**DNS Query Name Minimisation** Authoritatives net A Application net 172800 NS k.gtld-servers.net k.gtld-servers.net 172800 A 192.52.178.30 www.afrinic.net A Caching afrinic.net A Stub Recursive getaddrinfo() net Resolver OS afrinic.net 172800 NS nsl.afrinic.net www.afrinic.net 7200 A 196.216.2.6 nsl.afrinic.net 172800 A 196.216.2.1 www.afrinic.net A afrinic.net www.afrinic.net 7200 A 196.216.2.6


Privacy issues with DNS minimize data in queries – qname min


RFC7816 - DNS Query Name Minimisation







ITHI: 20.6% measured at root










Encryption	Privacy	icous with Icous with Icous of the second se	
Everywhere	DNS c	☆ □ ☆ ≥ ○ Q Filter these messages <0	ick Filter Q ≤ ≡ Ctrl+Shift+K>
	RFC8484	* • • From • Subject * • Mark Delany • [Doh] Clarification for a newbie D. * • Eric Rescorla • [Doh] Mozilla's plans re: DoH * • Eric Rescorla • Re: [Doh] Mozilla's plans re: DoH * • Matthew Pounsett • Re: [Doh] Mozilla's plans re: .	27-03-19 10:16 H 27-03-19 10:24
 + impossible to detect / block 	afrinic.net A	From Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> 🖈 Subject Re: [Doh] Mozilla's plans re: DoH To DoH WG <doh@ietf.org> 🛧</doh@ietf.org></ekr@rtfm.com>	Delete More 🗸
	- 196.21	······································	Preferences X
Browser (application) Stub	https 196.216.2.6	We have implemented DNS over HTTPS [RFC8484] and would deploy it by default for our users. We intend to select a set of Trusted Recursive Resolvers (TRRs) that we will use for DoH resolution. TRRs will be required to conform to a specific set of policies intended to protect user privacy. We're still refining the final policy but we expect it to roughly match the one that Clo has already agreed to use (https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/commitment-to-prive we expect the initial set of TRRs to be small, we're interested adding new providers who are able to comply with these policies	f of he oudflare t <u>ivacy/).While</u> d in cies.
	Local Network resolver	The precise details of the user interface are TBD, but we expension something like the following: 1. Copies of Firefox will be configured with a set of TRRs. Divergions may have different TRR sets or different defaults. In we may have DoH/TRR on by default in some regions and respecially initially.	ifferent n addition
		Unread	d: 1985 Total: 2159



DNS Measurements Hackathon Track Topics and motivation

- How would centralized cloud provided DNS resolvers impact Internet in the African region?
- Does it have performance implications?
- Does it have other implications? (Political?)
- Is it beneficial and achievable to provide local DoT or DoH resolvers?
- How can this best be achieved/realized?

Measuring DNS and DoH _y **Topics and motivation**

- Optimal DNS Latency
 - Compare latency of probes resolvers to cloud resolvers
- Resolver Jedi
 - How local are probe resolvers?
 Do they cross country borders?
- Run your own DoH and/or DoT server
 - Howto and evaluation of different possibilities
- DoH with DNS Messages in JSON
 - Provide DoH which is actually usable for applications
- Your Idea

Measuring DNS and DoH Common resources

- https://hackathon.internetsummitafrica.org/
- Subscribe to Slack hackathon@AIS2019 workspace #measuring-dns-and-doh channel
 Invite link
- Linux command line available with VM on NUC
- ssh to it with OpenSSH or putty: https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/

- High level overview: https://atlas.ripe.net/landing/about/
- Webinar:
 - https://www.ripe.net/support/training/webinars/webinarrecordings/webinar-ripe-atlas
- Documentation:
 - https://atlas.ripe.net/docs/
- Voucher for 5,000,000 credits! Posted on the Slack channel.
 - Thank you Lia! 🧡

- i.root-servers.net A query measurement to 1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8, 9.9.9.9 from Africa region probes made during Internet Measurements Workshop last weekend
 - 1.1.1.1 https://atlas.ripe.net/measurements/22015773/
 - 8.8.8.8 https://atlas.ripe.net/measurements/22015800/
 - 9.9.9.9 https://atlas.ripe.net/measurements/22015801/
 - Local 1st https://atlas.ripe.net/measurements/22015822/
 - Local 2nd https://atlas.ripe.net/measurements/22015846/
- Reuse probes from earlier measurement

Measurement #220 Measurement #220157		RIPE Network Coordination Centre - Chromium	easi	ırina		← Web		© IR I 11:07
→ C	as.ripe.net/measurements 37286	s/22015773/#!probes	VFAIL U19,188	@☆⊠ ₩:		77	3	24
14968 3491		E 🕹 2019-06-15 13:49 SER	·····			27		
50252 3243	3243	2019-06-15 13:49 NOI			uren	Tested	Blocked	Accessible
1378842235143163741	6939	 2019-06-15 13:49 SER 2019-06-15 13:49 SER 	•		pro		• • •	
12465 3741		ጆ 🚯 2019-06-15 13:49 SER	VFAIL 18.135		oct v		/1.1.1.1/dns-query?dr	
11620 29119		💶 🚯 2019-06-15 13:49 NOI	ERROR 17.846		ast \		ABAAAAAAAAAA3d3dv oQAAAQAB	waleGFtCG
13727 30619		⋿ 🚯 2019-06-15 13:49 SER	VFAIL 🔋 17.756					
30726 34803		🚢 💩 2019-06-15 13:49 NOI	ERROR 16.136		suren	http://v	www.alqassam.ps/	
26072 3352		💶 🚯 2019-06-15 13:49 REF	USED 16.107		-			
32890 12479		💶 🚯 2019-06-15 13:49 NO	ERROR 15.673		suren	https://	/mail.yahoo.com/	1
32584 205775	206020	💶 🚯 2019-06-15 13:49 NOI	ERROR 15.629			•••		
50272 203641		💶 🚯 2019-06-15 13:49 NOI	ERROR 14.471		suren	http:///	www.ifeminists.com	
14955 22690		💻 🚯 2019-06-15 13:49 NOI	ERROR 14.187				ww.ireminists.com	/
25210 37100	37100	≡ 🚯 2019-06-15 13:49 SER			suren			
25200 10474		🞽 🚯 2019-06-15 13:49 SER				http://v	www.topdrawers.cor	n/ 🗸
29491 202583		드 🚯 2019-06-15 13:49 NOI			surer			
13678 29119		드 🚯 2019-06-15 13:49 NOI	_					· · · · ·
13804 3741		Dbes from ea		,		\triangleleft	0	

- WHAT IS GOING ON WITH 1.1.1 IN THE AFRICA?
- Is this the same worldwide?
- Where are those measurements going? (traceroute to 1.1.1.1)
- Are DNS queries intercepted?
 - send whoami.akamai.net A to 8.8.8.8
 - Result should be any of list published at locations.publicdns.goog. TXT

- WHAT IS GOING ON WITH 1.1.1 IN THE AFRICA?
- Does DNS-over-TLS to 1.1.1.1 give same results
- Challenge!

DNS-over-TLS available, but not with web interface

- https://atlas.ripe.net/docs/api/v2/reference/
- https://ripe-atlas-cousteau.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
- https://ripe-atlas-tools.readthedocs.io/en/latest/

Measuring DNS and DoH Resolver Jedi

- Adapt IPX-country-jedi for traceroutes to probe IP address
- https://github.com/emileaben/ixp-country-jedi
- Warning! Probe resolvers are only mentioned in measurement results

Measuring DNS and DoH Run your own DoH and/or DoT server

- Try to get a client setup and working
 - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/software/mozilla-firefox-expa nds-dns-over-https-doh-test-to-release-channel/
 - https://github.com/bromite/bromite/wiki/Enabling-DNS-over-HTTPS
 - https://dnsprivacy.org/wiki/display/DP/DNS+Privacy+Clients
- Test if it is working:
 - https://1.1.1/help

Measuring DNS and DoH Run your own DoH and/or DoT server

- Setup server software on a VM on the NUC
- Resources:
 - Current state of software for DoH and DoT by Carsten Strotmann
 - https://doh.defaultroutes.de/implementations.html
 - Operational Experience providing DoH Service

Measuring DNS and DoH DoH with DNS messages in JSON

- Setup server software on a VM on the NUC
- RFC8427

Measuring DNS and DoH



Your Idea

Measuring DNS and DoH

- Introduction round
 - Who are you?
 - Where are you from?
 - Day job?
 - Experience?
 - Command line? Python? Hobbies?

Happy birthday Gervin!

