# The Root Canary

measuring and monitoring the impact of the KSK rollover

# Project partners

#### UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE.











# Canary in the coalmine



picture from academia.dk

https://rootcanary.org/

## Canary in the virtual coalmine

- Goals:
  - Track operational impact of the root KSK rollover, act as a warning signal that validating resolvers are failing to validate with the new key
  - Measure validation during the KSK rollover from a global perspective to learn from this type of event

## Operational actions

- If the canary starts to sing, or keels over and dies: an operator of a validating resolver may be in trouble! This type of monitoring gives us immediate insight into which operators have problems
- Notify (large?) operators that they need to take action — while most likely all resolving will fail, it may not affect all of their resolvers, etc. etc.

## Measurement goals

- This is the first time the root KSK is rolled
- Unique opportunity to record measurement data that can provide insight into the impact on the global Internet of such a rollover
- Goal is also to establish an observatory that covers the state of DNSSEC validation from multiple angles


## Measurement methodology

- Use four perspectives:
  - Online perspectives:
    - RIPE Atlas
    - Luminati
    - APNIC DNSSEC measurement (current thinking: use data during evaluation)
  - "Offline" perspective (analysed after measuring)
    - Traffic to root name servers (multiple letters)

## Measurement methodology

- We have signed and bogus records for all algorithms and most DS algorithms
- Side-effect: measure support for algorithms
- This gives us one of three outcomes:
  - Resolver validates correctly
  - Resolver fails to validate (SERVFAIL)
  - Resolver does not validate
  - (yes, there are corner cases probably not covered by these three options);-)


# Measurement phases



(picture courtesy of Taejoong "tijay" Chung, Northeastern University)

#### First results


• For common signing algorithms:



Last updated 2017-07-14 06:48:47.228925 UTC


#### First results

For deprecated and brand new algorithms:



Last updated 2017-07-14 06:48:47.465400 UTC

# First results (details)



CDF for time probes are in a state (shorter == many state changes)

total probe population state (24h and 7 days)

https://rootcanary.org/

## Takeaways from first results

- Introduction of the new key on July 11th has not led to noticeable problems on resolvers
- Significant proportion of RIPE Atlas probes are behind stable validating resolvers
- Google Public DNS returns SERVFAIL for RSA-MD5 (why not simply "insecure"?!)
- Support for ECDSA P-256 and P-384 almost at the same level as support for RSA-SHA256
- Support for Ed25519 and Ed448 is non-existent

# Spin-off result

Some of you may have already seen our DNSSEC algorithm test:



 Online test checks DS- and signing algorithms supported by configured resolvers

# Spin-off result

- Algorithm test has already led to fixes in:
  - PowerDNS —> test showed it returned
    SERVFAIL for domains signed using algorithms it didn't support, and faulty Ed25519 signatures
  - Knot Resolver —> test also showed SERVFAIL returns for unsupported algorithms [1]
  - [1] https://gitlab.labs.nic.cz/knot/knot-resolver/issues/210

# Work in progress

- Live feed of state changes for observed resolvers
- Portal environment that shows measurement state for DNS resolvers covered by RIPE Atlas probes
- Next upcoming major change: size of DNSKEY response for the root grows on September 19th

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#### More info

- Project webpage:
  https://rootcanary.org/
- Online algorithm test: https://rootcanary.org/test.html
- Current results for RIPE Atlas-based measurement: https://portal.rootcanary.org/rcmstats.html